1. Unity in Trinity
In this first short section of “The Triunity of God” (Gottes Dreieinigkeit), Barth enters fully into the difficult dance of language regarding God.
Given the importance of accurate language here, the translation of the opening sentences is very odd in one respect. The English translation, “The doctrine of the triunity of God, as this has been worked out and lightly maintained in the Church as an interpretation of biblical revelation . . .” (I/9/348) is hard to square with its German original, “Die Lehre von der Dreieinigkeit Gottes, wie sie sich in der Kirche als Interpretation der biblischen Offenbarung hinsichtlich der Frage nach dem Subjekt dieser Offenbarung herausgebildet und mit Recht behauptet hat . . .” (KD I/9/351).
This doctrine certainly has not been “lightly maintained” but rather “mit Recht behauptet,” *rightly* maintained. The German also makes even clearer: this Church teaching is an interpretation of biblical revelation, not the revelation itself (see previous chapter I/1/8).
Barth’s primary concern in I/1/9 is to maintain the insight that “God’s triunity does not imply any threat to but is rather the basis of the Christian concept of the unity of God.” (ibid.) As he expanded in a short excursus, “The Church doctrine of the Trinity … not only does not seek to obscure the εἷς θεός but rather to set it in the light as such.” It is not a faith that has three object, but One: and this is one of the great stumbling-blocks of mainstream Christian traditions for many. This is a very special usage of language: ordinarily one object cannot be one and three at once (metaphors aside), but in this case the assertion of the triunity is an assertion of the unity. Barth explicitly ties together concepts from biblical theologies in his time: Yahweh dwelling on Sinai, Yahweh dwelling in Jerusalem, or (New Testament) Father, Son, and Spirit to assert strongly:
. . . this essence of God that its unity is not only not abrogated by the threeness of the “persons” but rather that its unity consists in the threeness of the “persons.” Whatever else we may have to say about this threeness, in no case can it denote a threeness of essence. The triunity of God does not mean threefold deity either in the sense of a plurality of Gods or in the sense of the existence of a plurality of individuals or parts within the one Godhead. (I/9/349-350)
Barth obliquely references modern theological discourse only obliquely, when he states, “‘Person’ as used in the Church doctrine of the Trinity bears no direct relation to personality. The meaning of the doctrine is not, then, that there are three personalities in God. This would be the worst and most extreme expression of tritheism, against which we must be on guard at this stage. (I/9/351). Barth wants to avoid all discussion of “peronality,” a ponderous word in German intellectual circles in the early 20th century. Such language can only lead the Church astray.
The anti-Trinitarian heresies which arose in history, “all became heresies because they were answers to questions that had been wrongly put. In other words, they were attempts to reconcile falsely opposed concerns, i.e., to remove irrelevantly manufactured tensions.” (ibid.) The concept of “personality” could contribute to such manufactured tensions.
Barth maintains Church teaching in opposition to “manufactured tensions:”
In the predicate and object of the concept revelation we must again have, and to no less a degree, the subject itself. Revelation and revealing must be equal to the revealer. . . . Only the substantial equality of Christ and the Spirit with the Father is compatible with monotheism. I/9/352)